

49th GEF Council Meeting
October 20 – 22, 2015
Washington, D.C.

Agenda Item 06

FUTURE DIRECTIONS ON ACCREDITATION

¹ This version updates the total GEF grant amount for projects implemented by recently accredited GEF Project Agencies.

Recommended Council Decision

The Council, having reviewed document GEF/C.49/04/Rev.01, *Future Directions on Accreditation*, appreciates the opportunity to discuss possible future directions on Agency accreditation. The Council requests that the Secretariat conduct further analysis on the key issues identified in the document and that it provide an update on this work to Council at its spring 2016 meeting. The Council also requests that the IEO take the accreditation pilot into account in the planned review of the health of the GEF Partnership as part of the Sixth Overall Performance Study of the GEF (OPS6).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In October 2014, the Council requested the “Secretariat to present a paper regarding possible directions on accreditation in the context of the evolving GEF business model, as a basis for discussion at the 49th meeting of the Council.” The GEF’s “business model” is a broad term that potentially includes many elements, some of which have changed over time, and others that have not. The GEF Partnership is, perhaps, the aspect of the GEF business model that has changed the most since the GEF’s inception. Because understanding the way it functions is key to the accreditation question, the GEF Partnership is the principle focus of this paper in the terms of the context for accreditation.

2. Partnership – the idea that individual entities can have greater impact by working together than separately – was a founding principle of the GEF. This Partnership principle has continued to be relevant to the GEF throughout its history.

3. The GEF has gone through two phases of Agency expansion to date. The expansions aimed, among other things, to provide recipient countries with more choice, bring new expertise and networks to the GEF, and to tap additional co-financing sources. The most recent expansion was initiated in 2011, when the Council decided to undertake an accreditation pilot that has expanded the number of Agencies from ten to 18. A number of key lessons have emerged from these expansions. It is, however, too early to draw lessons on the impacts of the second exercise on the GEF in terms of its ability to accomplish its objectives.

4. The main future possible directions on accreditation are relatively straightforward to describe: one is that no additional Agencies are accredited, another is to accredit additional Agencies but only with a limited strategic expansion in numbers, and another is a broad-based expansion with a major increase in numbers.

5. In order to make an informed decision regarding future directions on accreditation, it is important to first understand how further accreditation could change the efficacy of the GEF Partnership in meeting its goals. The paper provides initial assessments of potential impacts on four key issues: coverage, competition, engagement, and efficiency. Key questions on each include:

- (a) *Coverage* - are there any gaps in the newly expanded GEF Partnership where the GEF needs significant value-addition from additional Agencies?
- (b) *Competition* - would more Agencies increase competition for GEF resources, and is this desirable?
- (c) *System efficiency* - would more Agencies mean more or less efficiency in delivering GEF finance?
- (d) *Engagement* - how would further accreditation impact Agency engagement in the GEF Partnership?

6. Some general observations can be made about the above issues and questions. First, what is striking is the number of potential trade-offs. Some of these tradeoffs, such as on the question of Agency engagement, relate to the heart of the GEF business model. Second, many of these potential impacts might require more experience, data gathering, and analysis over time. Third, many of the possible impacts from further accreditation depend on the number of Agencies relative to the total amount of GEF funding available. For example, more Agencies in a larger replenishment would have a very different impact on the above parameters than more Agencies in a flat replenishment.

7. It is recommended that the Council deliberate on the above possible directions and issues and provides guidance to the Secretariat on whether the analysis presented in the paper identifies the right key issues for deliberation, and what further analysis is required. The Council could request that the Secretariat conduct further analysis on the key issues, providing an update on this work to the Council at its spring 2016 meeting. The Council could also deliberate on how IEO could take the accreditation pilot into account in the planned review of the health of the GEF Partnership as a part of the Sixth Overall Performance Study of the GEF (OPS6).

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INTRODUCTION

1. In October 2014, in the context of reviewing Council Document C.47/10,² the Council requested the **“Secretariat to present a paper regarding possible directions on accreditation in the context of the evolving GEF business model, as a basis for discussion at the 49th meeting of the Council.”** This paper, therefore, describes some possible directions for accreditation and presents key considerations and questions that the Council could consider in its deliberations.

2. **The GEF’s “business model” is a broad term that potentially includes many elements, some of which have changed over time and others which have not.** These include, for example, the number and types of Partner Agencies,³ the resource allocation system, the project development and approval process, and processes for monitoring, evaluation, and learning. A key element of the GEF’s business model, and one that is especially pertinent to this paper, is the “GEF Partnership.” For this paper, this term is taken to mean the range of entities and institutions involved in providing GEF financing to countries, including the 18 GEF Partner Agencies and the GEF Secretariat. The 18 Partner Agencies are: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD), Conservation International (CI), the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Foreign Economic Cooperation Office of the Ministry of Environment – China (FECO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Fundo Brasileiro para a Biodiversidade – Brazil (FUNBIO), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Bank, and World Wildlife Fund, Inc. (WWF-US). Of note, DBSA, FECO, and FUNBIO are national entities.

3. **The GEF Partnership is, perhaps, the aspect of the GEF business model that has changed the most since the GEF’s inception – and understanding the way it functions is key to the accreditation question.** Indeed, the recently concluded accreditation pilot originated from a GEF-5 reform to broaden the Partnership in order to, among other things, provide recipient countries with greater choice in terms of Agencies with which to work and to enable GEF to benefit from new capabilities and networks – and one of the key goals of the pilot was to accredit national entities. This paper will, therefore, consider the question of accreditation in the context of mainly this aspect of the evolving GEF business model.

² [Progress Report on the Pilot Accreditation of GEF Project Agencies & Timeline for Further Discussion of Accreditation](#)

³ The ten Agencies that were part of the GEF prior to the start of the accreditation pilot are referred to as the “GEF Agencies,” or “the ten GEF Agencies” for clarity. Agencies accredited under the pilot are referred to as “GEF Project Agencies.” Both groups are collectively referred to as the “GEF Partner Agencies.”

THE GEF PARTNERSHIP AND ACCREDITATION

4. **Partnership – the idea that individual entities can have greater impact by working together than separately – was a founding principle of the GEF.** The GEF was designed as an innovative and collaborative undertaking among Agencies working at the intersection of development and global environmental issues. The intention was to leverage the individual strengths of the Agencies, in their activities with recipient countries and other stakeholders, to achieve global environmental benefits that were incremental and additional to their existing operations.

5. **The Instrument envisioned that the GEF would operate “on the basis of collaboration and Partnership among” the Agencies and that within this setting, the Agencies would “strive ... to strengthen their collaboration and effectiveness, in particular at the country level,”** with “an efficient division of labor that maximizes the synergy among them and recognizes their terms of reference and comparative advantages.”⁴ In this regard, key roles of the GEF Secretariat include servicing the Council and the Assembly and facilitating coordination and collaboration among GEF Agencies and other partners in their collective effort to implement the decisions of the Assembly and the Council.⁵

6. **This Partnership principle has continued to be relevant to the GEF throughout its history.** While the GEF is now a Partnership 18 Agencies, it functions as an inter-organizational network (see Text Box 1 below) with funding at its core. The GEF continues to rely on the strengths of its Agencies and it works to foster collaboration among them. Agencies within the Partnership continue to show a strong desire to participate in discussions on institutional policy and strategy formulation.

7. **There are many different models of types of network organizations.** At one extreme, the original GEF Partnership included a small number of organizations with shared decision-making. At the other extreme, there are foundation-type models where any entity can apply for funding, and as such there is a more hierarchical division of labor between the funding entity and its contractors. The GEF is perhaps in the middle of this continuum, having shifted from the small Partnership of its origins to a network of 18 entities.

⁴ [Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility](#), p. 37.

⁵ See [the GEF Instrument](#) for more details on formal role of the Secretariat, pp. 18-19 and pp. 38-39,

Text Box 1: Networks – An Extract

Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement. Networks exhibit some structural stability but extend beyond formally established linkages and policy-legitimated ties. The notion of network excludes mere formal hierarchies and perfect markets, but it includes a very wide range of structures in between. The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all within a single multi-unit structure. In networks, administrators cannot be expected to exercise decisive leverage by virtue of their formal position. Influence in larger networks is more difficult to document, predict, and model than it is in relatively simple two- or three-party relationships.

O’Toole, Laurence J. Jr. 1997. *Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-based Agendas in Public Administration*. *Public Administration Review* 57 (1): 45-52.

8. The GEF Partnership has gone through **two phases of Agency expansion**:
 - (a) The **first expansion** took place between 1999 and 2006, when the Partnership expanded by adding **seven additional Agencies** – the four regional development banks (RDBs) as well as FAO, IFAD, and UNIDO – through the policy on “expanded opportunities”.
 - (b) In 2011, the Council decided to undertake a **second expansion** when it agreed to conduct a pilot to accredit new implementing entities. The purpose of the pilot was to expand country choice, provide the GEF with additional expertise and new networks, and pilot the accreditation of some national Agencies as a priority. This pilot has expanded the number of Agencies from 10 to 18.⁶ As explained below, the process of integrating these Agencies into the Partnership is ongoing.

9. **The first expansion aimed to provide recipient countries with more choice, bring new expertise and networks to the GEF, and to tap additional co-financing sources.**⁷ FAO, IFAD, and UNIDO were explicitly added to the Partnership to provide the GEF with additional expertise and networks in the new focal areas of land degradation and persistent organic pollutants. The participation of these new Agencies in the GEF occurred in a phased manner,

⁶ The eight new GEF Project Agencies accredited under the pilot are: BOAD, CAF, CI, DBSA, FECO, FUNBIO, IUCN, and WWF-US.

⁷ See Council Document GEF/C.13/3, *Expanded Opportunities for Executing Agencies: Recent Efforts and Current Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Regional Development Banks* (May 1999)

starting with access to project preparation grants and evolving into full project implementation.⁸ Four findings stand out from the period after their joining the GEF:

- (a) First, the entrance of additional Agencies provided more choice to partner countries and helped fill gaps in the GEF portfolio, thereby allowing the GEF to better serve as the financial mechanism for the Stockholm Convention and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification⁹.
- (b) Second, the seven new Agencies' participation in the GEF proceeded slowly, in part because of a lack of experience in securing and managing GEF finance, a lack of corporate budgets, exclusion from corporate policy discussions, and limitations to participation to certain focal areas.¹⁰
- (c) Third, starting with the [Third Overall Performance Study \(OPS3\)](#), the IEO has found consistently that competition among Agencies has increased as they started looking "ever wider for projects and investigate new lines of [GEF] business to support their sustained growth" and that this tendency was "exacerbated by the addition of the seven new Agencies."¹¹ As noted below, this tendency for increased competition has continued over time.
- (d) Fourth, as early as [OPS3](#), the IEO had concluded that with the addition of seven new Agencies, the GEF was already "reaching the limits of what could be done in a network organization."¹² The main issue of concern for the IEO has been that the overall increase in complexity of the GEF Partnership/network has increased the number of necessary interactions and communications linkages required, which imposes additional transaction costs.¹³ (See the discussion below on agency engagement, paragraph 26).

10. Between GEF-3 and GEF-5, the project grant share of the seven Agencies from the first expansion increased significantly. As shown in the figures below, these Agencies increased their share of grant resources to approximately 26% of the portfolio as of GEF-5. At the same

⁸ See following for more information: GEF Evaluation Office, *Evaluation of the Experience of Executing Agencies under Expanded Opportunities in the GEF*, May 2007, pages pp 14-16. (Main findings presented to Council in December 2006 in Council Document GEF/ME/C.30/4). The RDBs gained access to project preparation grants in 1999, but the process for granting full direct access to the seven Agencies unfolded slowly. The seven Agencies signed the necessary memorandum of understanding with the GEF Secretariat and financial procedures agreement with the Trustee in the following order: IDB in 2003; ADB and UNIDO in 2004; FAO, AfDB, and IFAD in 2005; and EBRD in 2006.

⁹ United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

¹⁰ Ibid, pp 5-8. See Annex I for background on reforms to "level the playing field" among the ten GEF Agencies.

¹¹ Global Environment Facility, [Third Overall Performance Study of the GEF: Progressing Toward Environmental Results](#), Page 10.


¹² See [Fourth Overall Performance Study of the GEF \(OPS4\)](#), page 188.

¹³ See Health of the Partnership: OPS5 Technical Document 17 for an in depth discussion.

time, there has also been a shift of resources from the World Bank to UNDP. The World Bank's share fell from 47% in GEF-3 to 20% in GEF-5, whereas UNDP's share has risen from approximately 30% to 40% over the same time period. The share of UNEP has risen slightly. As shown in Table 2, however, except for FAO and UNIDO, most of the newer Agencies' shares remain at about 2% of the portfolio.

11. **Many factors have influenced Agency project shares – not only the addition of new Agencies since 1999, but perhaps, more importantly, other significant reforms introduced at the start of GEF-4.** These reforms included the introduction of the Resource Allocation Framework (RAF), the reforms designed to increase the participation of the seven new GEF Agencies,¹⁴ and the refinement of comparative advantage in 2007,¹⁵ which included an expansion in the role of the specialized UN Agencies such that IFAD, UNIDO, and FAO could work in focal areas where they had comparative advantage.

Figure 1: GEF Grant Shares¹⁶ per Major Agency Groups by Replenishment




¹⁴ The RAF was replaced by the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR). The reforms to increase the participation of the seven new Agencies consisted of several measures, including discontinuation of the corporate budget allocations of the three IAs, the inclusion of the seven Agencies in corporate discussions, and a one percentage point increase in Agency fees. See [Council Document GEF/C.30/9](#).

¹⁵ See [Council Document GEF/C.31/5, Comparative Advantages of the GEF Agencies](#).

¹⁶ Grants are for single full-size, medium-size, and enabling activity projects from all GEF-managed trust funds. It does not include grants initially allocated to parent programmatic approaches that have not yet been allocated to approved-child projects under the programs. **The category “others” includes the seven Agencies that joined in the first expansion (accounting for 25.5% of the GEF-5 portfolio) as well as CI and WWF-US, which joined the GEF in GEF-5 (and accounted for 1%).** See Annex I, Table 1 for an Agency-by-Agency breakdown.

Figure 2: GEF Grant Shares of Newer Agencies by Replenishment



12. **A number of lessons have emerged regarding the pilot accreditation process, which was recently assessed by the IEO.** The [Evaluation of the Accreditation Process for Expansion of the GEF Partnership](#), Council Document GEF/ME/C.48/Inf.03, noted the following findings, among others, about the process:

- (a) The implementation of the accreditation process was found to be satisfactory and the pilot was seen as having been designed and implemented in a “largely transparent” manner.
- (b) The pilot accreditation process took longer than expected for several reasons, including the fact that applicants needed to undertake substantial work in order to meet mandatory standards in several areas.
- (c) Contrary to initial expectations in 2010, the accreditation process was not found to be entirely cost-neutral for the GEF Trust Fund.¹⁷
- (d) Early results indicated that the process has expanded the choices of recipient countries in terms of Agencies to work with and has provided the GEF with “access to new expertise and networks” as well as “field presence in new areas.”

¹⁷ See pages 33 through 37 of Council Document GEF/ME/C.48/Inf.03, [Evaluation of the Accreditation Process for Expansion of the GEF Partnership](#)

- (e) The accreditation process helped newly accredited Project Agencies build their systems to manage GEF resources. The Agencies reported that they have gained from the accreditation process through improvements in their internal systems and standards in terms of fiduciary and risk management, environmental and social safeguards, and gender mainstreaming.¹⁸ This is mainly because the GEF has chosen to adopt common, high level standards on these issues as part of an approach to create a Partnership of excellence.¹⁹

13. **It is too early to draw lessons on the impacts of the accreditation pilot on the GEF in terms of on-the-ground project outcomes.** Only in June 2015 did the eighth (and final) applicant conclude Stage II of the accreditation process, and two Agencies are still in the process of completing their Financial Procedures Agreement with the Trustee to complete the third and final stage of the process.²⁰ To date, the Council has approved 13 projects (six MSPs and seven FSPs) for a total value of \$70.8 million that are being developed or implemented by four of these Agencies, and the first project was only approved in November 2013. (See Table 2 in Annex I for more information.) A key rationale for accreditation has been to increase recipient country choice. The recent pilot accreditation exercise, seen in that light, has almost doubled the number of Agencies. However, the extent to which recipient governments will exercise this choice over time is still to be seen.

POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS ON ACCREDITATION

14. The main possible directions on accreditation are relatively straightforward to describe. One direction is that **no additional Agencies are accredited** – hence the GEF Partnership would remain with the current 18 Agencies. This could be a short-run approach until more experience is gathered on the impact of the pilot accreditation exercise, and/or a longer-term direction based on a decision that the GEF has the appropriate number and type of Agencies. Another direction is that **additional Agencies are accredited**, but only with a **limited strategic expansion**, where a small number would be accredited to fill any significant gaps that the Council believes need to be filled. Another direction is **broad-based expansion**, where a large

¹⁸ For example, all Agencies put in place or upgraded environmental and social safeguard systems and several needed to improve fiduciary systems, such as putting in place internal audit systems. Ibid, page 15.

¹⁹ The Council had adopted a Policy on minimum fiduciary standards for GEF Agencies in 2007 in order “to strengthen financial and programmatic accountability in the GEF” by requiring that all Agencies with direct access to GEF resources meet minimum fiduciary standards that are “consistent with international practice.” In May 2011, as part of accreditation pilot, the Council adopted a *Policy on Gender Mainstreaming* in order to “enhance the degree to which the GEF and its Partner Agencies promote the goal of gender equality through GEF operations. In November of that year, the Council adopted the Policy titled *Agency Minimum Standards on Environmental and Social Safeguards* “to support environmentally sustainable development by ensuring that the GEF and its Partner Agencies undertake sufficient efforts to avoid, minimize, mitigate, and where appropriate, offset any adverse impacts to people and the environment from GEF-financed operations.”

²⁰ See Annex I for further detail.

number of additional Agencies would be accredited. If further accreditation is pursued, there are a number of questions that would need to be addressed in terms of the accreditation process to be followed, such as the timing, standards, and the Agency selection.

15. To make an informed decision regarding future directions on accreditation, however, it is important to first understand how further accreditation could change the efficacy of the GEF Partnership in meeting its goals - including potentially profound impacts on the GEF business model. The next section presents some key issues and questions.

STRATEGIC ISSUES TO GUIDE COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS

16. **The possible directions mentioned above have different costs, benefits, and trade-offs, which will ultimately affect the GEF's ability to accomplish its objectives.** The section below suggests four issues for discussion that are key parameters for deliberations on future accreditation: i) coverage; ii) competition; iii) engagement, and; iv) efficiency.

Coverage: are there any gaps in the newly expanded GEF Partnership where the GEF needs significant value-addition from additional Agencies?

17. **A mapping exercise²¹ to explore whether the current GEF Partnership of 18 Agencies have the right set of skills and coverage to meet the GEF's goals is needed to answer this question.** Dimensions for such an analysis could be an inventory of the GEF's needs, the comparative advantage of current GEF Agencies to meet these needs, and whether or not the GEF has any unmet needs or areas for further value addition in terms of institutions, key themes, or geographic coverage. It could also assess any changes to the international architecture on development and environmental finance since the accreditation pilot started that need to be taken into account.

18. **The experience of the newly accredited Agencies, particularly the three national Agencies, will be valuable to observe in the coming period to inform such analyzes.** In this regard, several new Agencies are already making positive contributions to the GEF in terms of individual projects and their participation in programmatic approaches. (See Annex I for a list of both). The DBSA, for example, will implement a highly innovative non-grant pilot project in South Africa that takes advantage of DBSA's extensive financial experience to promote innovative approaches for small-scale renewable power producers in a model that could apply across Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the international CSOs are also making positive contributions in natural-resource related focal areas.

²¹ In June 2007, the Council reviewed Document GEF/C.31/5, [Comparative Advantages of the GEF Agencies](#), which mapped the coverage of the GEF Agencies in terms of focal areas and type of intervention (e.g. investment, technical assistance/capacity building, and scientific and technical analysis).

19. **As the GEF increasingly seeks programs and projects that develop integrated solutions to the complex drivers behind environmental degradation, an important capability required of the GEF Partnership is to be able to put together coalitions to promote change.** In this regard, a key question is whether the existing Partnership has the current and potential capabilities needed. From recent experience in engaging with Agencies in the design of Integrated Approach Pilots (IAPs), the Secretariat’s initial perspective is that the current GEF Partnership included the required technical, organizational capabilities, and access to networks to engage in the IAP designs.

Competition: would more Agencies increase competition for GEF resources, and is this desirable?

20. **The IEO²² has observed that, as the number of Agencies has increased, competition among Agencies for GEF resources has also increased.** Depending on the size of future replenishments, more Agencies might result in more competition. There are mixed views across the Partnership on the extent to which the current level of competition between Agencies is productive and adds value, or whether it is, in some situations, unproductive and distortionary.

21. **Some competition is a healthy aspect of a vibrant network.** Competition can act as a stimulus to meet client needs through more direct engagement, quality PIFs, higher levels of co-financing, and successful implementation as a way of ensuring repeat requests from OFPs to Agencies to implement projects.

22. **However, some forms of competition might also be counter-productive** – for example, where they lessen Agency collaboration at the global and ground level, lead to an unclear and inefficient division of labor between Agencies, add pressure on Operational Focal Points in terms of exposing them to lobbying from an increasing number of Agencies.²³ The IEO noted that incentives that Agencies face at the country level appear to be driving greater competition rather than collaboration (as originally envisioned by the Instrument). OPS5 also stated that Agencies themselves noted an “unhealthy” level of competition for resources among Agencies.²⁴

23. **Further analysis on this aspect of the health of the Partnership would be useful in assessing how further accreditation might affect the above dynamics.** Such an analysis should

²² Starting with [Third Overall Performance Study3 \(OPS3\)](#), the IEO has noted an increase of competition between Agencies within the GEF family since the GEF partnership expanded beyond the original 3 Agencies. See OPS3, page 57 and [OPS5 Technical Document #17: Health of the Partnership](#).

²³ As noted in [OPS4](#), recipient country governments have a perception that “Agencies seem to be more interested in selling their projects than attending to the needs of the recipient countries.”

²⁴ See OPS-5, pp 41-42. “Some Agency staff expressed concerns that too much emphasis on competition and cost-cutting may now be eroding the underlying principles of partnership and collaborative approaches.”

take into account that there are other key drivers of competition. At the network level, the introduction of the Resource Allocation Framework in GEF-4²⁵ created a “budget” for GEF resources, incentivizing competition for OFP endorsements²⁶. Additionally, GEF fee and Agency budget systems may create incentives for competition in a cost-recovery environment – in particular, the ‘fee per project/program’ Agency remuneration system,²⁷ and some Agency internal budget and fee management systems that remunerate staff solely from GEF fee income.

System efficiency: would more Agencies mean more or less efficiency in delivering GEF finance?

24. It is likely that having more partners adds transaction costs to the GEF, but this would need to be assessed over time. For example, while the GEF is now able to rely on the strengths and experiences of 18 Agencies, the central functions of the GEF (e.g. IEO, Secretariat, STAP and Trustee) must now communicate and engage with more partners than previously. This increases the transaction costs related to GEF corporate activities, including policy and strategy formulation, external engagement and communications, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge management. The IEO discussed the increased costs associated with the increased number of Agencies in the document [Health of the Partnership: OPS5 Technical Document #17](#), particularly for Operational Focal Points and the Secretariat,²⁸ but the findings are also relevant for the IEO, STAP, and Trustee²⁹. The additional partnership transaction costs arising from the addition of Agencies from the latest round of accreditations has not yet been measured, and therefore could form the basis for future analysis.

25. An additional efficiency concern is the impact of accreditation on average GEF project size. This is relevant to system efficiency because a portfolio of many small projects typically will have higher administrative costs than the opposite.³⁰ As pointed out by the IEO³¹, and confirmed by recent data, the average full-size project grant fell from \$7.57 million in the early

²⁵ The RAF was reformed into the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR) starting with GEF-5.

²⁶ The GEF IEO has also noted that “One of the weaknesses of the GEF Activity Cycle (e.g. the project cycle) is that it encourages competition among Agencies for projects, which tend not to discuss projects with one another. See *Evaluation of the Experience of Executing Agencies under Expanded Opportunities in the GEF*, page 16.

²⁷ The project implementation fee for Agencies has been adjusted several times over the history of the GEF, most recently in June 2012. Another notable change was the discontinuation of corporate budgets for the three Implementing Agencies in 2007.

²⁸ See [Health of the Partnership: OPS5 Technical Document #17](#), p. 5.

²⁹ For example, in the same way that it is more work for the Secretariat to conduct portfolio monitoring across a partnership of 18, than of a partnership of three or ten, the IEO will also need to build relationships with the evaluation units of the new Agencies. The Trustee also faces increased costs in terms of ensuring that all 18 Agencies are following required financial procedures so that data flows are consistent and compatible.

³⁰ The comparatively higher administrative costs of smaller projects is reflected in the GEF fee structure, where smaller projects have higher percentage fees.

³¹ See [Midterm Evaluation of the System of Transparent Allocation of Resources](#), pp. 50-51.

years of the GEF (e.g. Pilot Phase through GEF-3) to \$5.56 million more recently (during GEF-4 and GEF-5).³² While the introduction of the RAF and STAR appear to have been a driver, it is sensible to consider whether adding more Agencies to the GEF might have been – or could be in the future – another driver of smaller average project size.

Engagement: how would further accreditation impact Agency engagement in the GEF Partnership?

26. **Across both expansions of the Partnership, Agencies have demonstrated a continuous, strong desire to engage as partners, particularly in terms of policy and strategy development.**

The [Fourth Overall Performance Study of the GEF \(OPS4\)](#) found that the Agencies “would very much like to be considered partners rather than project contractors.”³³ The newly accredited Agencies under the pilot have also shown a strong interest in engaging in such corporate discussions, and can potentially bring new and different perspectives into them.

27. **However, there are some risks from further expansion of the Partnership in terms of overall Agency engagement.** It clear that a Partnership of a relatively few entities is quite different from a broad network of implementing entities, such as those found in some other global fund models. As Agency numbers rise, it is more difficult to engage them to the same extent as in a small Partnership. This is clearly borne out in IEO findings, which note that as the number of Agencies has increased, “the majority of the Agencies interviewed, as well as the Secretariat, observed that consultation, much less coordination, during the development of operational policies had decreased.”³⁴ If Agency numbers increase further, the stake of each Agency in the success of the overall GEF Partnership might diminish - and so might the quality of their engagement in overall policy development, results-based management, and knowledge management activities. A core question for the Council to address, therefore, is what kind of Partnership the Council wishes the GEF to be: a broad-based network that resembles a foundation, or a smaller and closer Partnership of committed Agencies with a high stake in its success?

Some General Observations

28. Some general observations can be made about the above issues:

- (a) **First, what is striking in assessing the issues above is the number of potential trade-offs within and between them.** For example, between Agency coverage and system efficiency, between competition and collaboration, engagement and coverage, and also between competition and efficiency. Some trade-offs – such as

³² This is for GEF Trust Fund projects only.

³³ Perez del Castillo, Carlos, OPS4 August 2009, [OPS4 Technical Document #5: Governance of the GEF](#).

³⁴ See *Health of the Partnership: OPS5 Technical Document #17*, page 6.

on the question of Agency engagement - relate to the heart of the GEF business model, and may require further assessment.

- (b) **Second, many of the possible impacts from further accreditation depend on the number of Agencies relative to the total amount of GEF funding available.** For example, more Agencies in a larger replenishment would have a very different impact on the above issues than more Agencies in a flat replenishment.
- (c) **Third, a proper assessment of many of these issues will likely require more experience, data gathering, and analysis over time once the recently accredited Project Agencies have had more experience within the GEF Partnership.** Such data gathering and analysis would be a significant exercise for the Partnership.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED NEXT STEPS

29. It is recommended that the Council deliberates on the issues above and provides guidance to the Secretariat on:

- (a) Whether the analysis presented in the paper identifies the right key issues for deliberation; and
- (b) What further analysis is required from the Secretariat and IEO to expand on and provide further evidence to better answer the above questions and determine the future direction on accreditation?

30. The Council could request that the Secretariat conduct further analysis on the key questions identified in the paper, providing an update on this work to the Council at its spring 2016 meeting. The Council could also deliberate on how IEO can take the accreditation pilot into account in the planned review of the health of the GEF Partnership as part of the Sixth Overall Performance Study of the GEF (OPS6).

ANNEX I: EVOLUTION OF THE GEF PARTNERSHIP

1. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in 1991 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or the World Bank) accompanied by interagency procedural arrangements with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). From the start, the GEF financed its activities through three agencies – the UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank. The initial roles of these three agencies in proposing GEF activities conformed to their acknowledged or defined “comparative advantages” within the GEF.³⁵ World Bank’s role was to develop and implement investment projects; UNDP’s to undertake capacity building and pre-investment projects; and, UNEP to take the lead in research projects.
2. In March 1994, the representatives of 73 participating states accepted the *Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility* (the GEF Instrument), transforming the GEF from an experiment into a permanent financial mechanism.³⁶ The Instrument established UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank as the three Implementing Agencies of the GEF, and it provides important roles to them, some of which have changed over time.³⁷
3. From 1991 through 1999, the three IAs were responsible for the implementation of all GEF projects. As called for under paragraph 28 of the Instrument, the Secretariat and IAs cooperated with other international institutions to promote achievement of the purposes of the GEF. These organizations, particularly the four leading regional multilateral development banks (RDBs) and United Nations organizations, began participating in GEF projects as executing agencies under the lead of one of the three IAs. Only the three IAs, however, could access GEF resources directly. In addition to project implementation fees, the three IAs also received corporate budget allocations, to support their “corporate activities” in the GEF, such as involvement in the setting of policy and strategy.
4. There was an increasing demand – from the Council, from recipient countries, and from the executing agencies themselves – to increase their role in the GEF. As early as 1994, the World Bank had started engaging with the four regional development banks on GEF activities.³⁸ Between May 1999 and November 2003, the GEF Council discussed whether to provide “expanded opportunities” for executing agencies in the GEF, including providing them direct access to resources from the GEF trust fund. Over this period, the Council adopted decisions that provided, in a phased manner, expanded opportunities for these agencies in the GEF. The process started when the Council agreed to enable RDBs to prepare and implement GEF

³⁵ *Global Environment Facility – Independent Evaluation of the Pilot Phase*. 1994. IEG, World Bank.

³⁶ After formal adoption by the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP, the GEF Instrument became effective on 7 July 1994.

³⁷ For instance, the governing bodies of the three IAs must adopt any amendments of the Instrument after approval by the GEF Assembly. See GEF Instrument, Paragraph 34.

³⁸ See Council Document GEF/C.2/inf.2, *Collaboration between the World Bank and Regional Development Banks in GEF Implementation: A Status Report* (November 1994).

projects, with the initial step of providing preparatory grant resources to them directly. Over time, the seven additional organizations now referred to as GEF Agencies (the four RDBs and FAO, IFAD, and UNIDO)³⁹ were added to the GEF partnership and progressively gained direct access to GEF resources.

5. Objectives for this expansion were to provide more choice to recipient countries, bring new expertise and networks to the GEF partnership, and to tap additional co-financing sources.⁴⁰ The addition of new focal areas to the GEF (e.g. land degradation and POPs) provided an impetus to add FAO, IFA, and UNIDO to the GEF because these Agencies had particular expertise in these focal areas that other agencies did not have. It is important to note that the “defined comparative advantage” of these Agencies was initially restricted to these areas. Until 2007, IFAD’s defined comparative advantage (for projects in which it would have direct access to GEF resources) was restricted to projects and activities relating to land degradation. Similarly, FAO was limited to projects and activities related to agricultural POPs, and UNIDO was limited to projects and activities relating to industrial POPs.⁴¹

6. The Council approved these seven Agencies’ participation in GEF as project implementers under the “expanded opportunities policy,” because they were found to meet three main criteria: (a) strategic match, (b) institutional capacity, and (c) complementarity.⁴² Their involvement in GEF operations increased slowly, however, and the *Policy Recommendations for the Fourth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund* called on the GEF Evaluation Office (now the GEF IEO) to “prepare a review of experience of Executing Agencies for Council consideration in December 2006.” The Policy Recommendations also requested the Secretariat to “develop by December 2006, in consultation with the GEF agencies and taking into account the review, an action plan for strengthening the involvement of these agencies in GEF operations.⁴³”

7. The IEO evaluation [*Evaluation of the Experience of Executing Agencies under Expanded Opportunities in the GEF*](#)⁴⁴ concluded that even though the new agencies were at par with the international standards in terms of project quality, they faced structural challenges due to absence of a level playing field. At the same meeting, the Council discussed document

³⁹ These agencies were previously referred to as “Executing Agencies” which is imprecise because they were actually given responsibility to “implement” projects with accountability to the Council for their GEF activities.

⁴⁰ See Council Document GEF/C.13/3, *Expanded Opportunities for Executing Agencies: Recent Efforts and Current Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Regional Development Banks* (May 1999)

⁴¹ *Evaluation of the Experience of Executing Agencies under Expanded Opportunities in the GEF*, GEF Evaluation Office.

⁴² GEF Council Document GEF/C.22/12, *Review of Experience with Executing Agencies under Expanded Opportunities*, page 4.

⁴³ See Council Document GEF/C.29/3, *Summary of Negotiations on the Fourth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund*.

⁴⁴ Council Document GEF/ME/C.30/4, December 2006.

GEF/C.30/9, [Roles and Comparative Advantages of the GEF Implementing Agencies](#), and decided to establish a “level playing field” among all ten GEF Agencies.⁴⁵ This included abolition of the three IA’s corporate budget allocations, the inclusion of the additional seven Agencies in all corporate activities, and adjustment of Agencies’ project management fees by adding an additional percentage point (increase from 9% to 10%) to support each Agencies’ participation in corporate activities.

8. In June 2007, the Council approved adjustments to the defined comparative advantage of some of the ten GEF Agencies when it reviewed Council Document GEF/C.31/5, *Comparative Advantages of the GEF Agencies*. This document categorized and described each Agency’s comparative advantage according to focal area and type of intervention as set forth in Annex D of the GEF Instrument (e.g. investment, capacity building/technical assistance, and scientific and technical analysis). Among other things, this document enabled IFAD, FAO, and UNIDO to expand into some additional focal areas where there were able to demonstrate expertise and project experience in their non-GEF activities. Following this refinement, UNIDO, for example, started working in the climate change mitigation and international waters focal areas. FAO started work in the land degradation and biodiversity focal areas.

9. As reported by the GEF IEO in Council Document GEF/ME/C.48/Inf.03, [Evaluation of the Accreditation Process for Expansion of the GEF Partnership](#), “With inclusion and subsequent establishment of a level playing field, increasingly the relationship among the Agencies became more competitive.”⁴⁶ At the same time, the GEF introduced the Resource Allocation Framework – the precursor to the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources. This led to greater country coverage through GEF funded activities but also to increasing fragmentation of resources. The IEO found that, taken together, these reforms created more space for Agencies that could implement smaller projects.⁴⁷

10. These trends are shown clearly in the table below. One notices a significant drop in the share of the World Bank from 47% in GEF-3 to 19.5% in GEF-4, whereas the share of UNDP has risen from 30.6% to 39.4% over the same time.

⁴⁵ Joint Summary of Chairs – GEF Council Meeting. December 2006.

⁴⁶ GEF IEO, *Evaluation of the Accreditation Process for Expansion of the GEF Partnership*, page 2.

⁴⁷ GEF IEO, *Mid Term Evaluation of the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources*. September 2014.

Table 1: GEF Grant Amount⁴⁸ and Share per Agency by Replenishment
(Pilot Phase through GEF-5⁴⁹)

	Pilot Phase		GEF - 1		GEF - 2		GEF - 3		GEF - 4		GEF - 5		Total	
	\$M	%	\$M	%	\$M	%	\$M	%	\$M	%	\$M	%	\$M	%
World Bank	423.6	58.4	754.1	61.4	959.7	51.9	1,298.2	46.7	697.2	25.3	807.9	19.5	4,940.8	36.6
UNDP	253.0	34.9	297.7	24.2	568.8	30.8	851.7	30.6	1,069.1	38.7	1,635.5	39.4	4,675.8	34.7
UNEP	19.0	2.6	43.7	3.6	164.1	8.9	224.6	8.1	274.4	9.9	481.5	11.6	1,207.3	8.9
ADB					6.4	0.3	43.1	1.6	77.0	2.8	43.1	1.0	169.7	1.3
AfDB									8.4	0.3	118.9	2.9	127.3	0.9
EBRD									22.2	0.8	60.7	1.5	83.0	0.6
FAO									61.5	2.2	331.5	8.0	393.0	2.9
IADB							15.3	0.6	71.5	2.6	165.4	4.0	252.2	1.9
IFAD							26.2	0.9	73.4	2.7	74.6	1.8	174.3	1.3
UNIDO					10.7	0.6	17.6	0.6	167.9	6.1	262.0	6.3	458.2	3.4
CI											17.8	0.4	17.8	0.1
WWF-US											24.4	0.6	24.4	0.2
Multiple Agencies	30.0	4.1	133.0	10.8	139.1	7.5	303.3	10.9	238.1	8.6	127.0	3.1	970.5	7.2
TOTAL	725.6	100	1,228.6	100	1,848.9	100	2,780.0	100	2,760.7	100	4,150.3	100	13,494.1	100


11. If one groups the Agencies with approved projects through GEF-5⁵⁰ into respective categories – MDBs/IFIs (World Bank, ADB, AfDB, EBRD, IFAD, and IADB), UN Agency (UNDP, UNEP, FAO, and UNIDO) and CSO (CI and WWF) – the trend seen above in terms of the World Bank and UNDP is accentuated. The share of UN Agency grants rises from 40% in GEF-3 to 67% in GEF-5, whereas the share of projects accounted for by MDBs/IFIs falls from 49% in GEF-3 to 29%. The share accounted for by CSOs is only about 1% in GEF-5. The share of projects implemented by more than one Agency (multi-agency projects) rose to 11% in GEF-3 and has declined since then to 3% in GEF-5.

⁴⁸ Grants are for single full-size, medium-size, or enabling activity projects from all GEF-managed trust funds. It does not count grants initially allocated to parent programmatic approaches that have not yet been allocated to approved-child projects under the programs.

⁴⁹ Results from GEF-6 not included as data from only the first year of the replenishment is available.

⁵⁰ Of the eight new GEF Project Agencies, only two – CI and WWF-US – had approved projects in GEF-5.

Figure 3: GEF Grant Share per Agency Type by Replenishment



Pilot on Accrediting Project Agencies

12. Discussions on whether to broaden the GEF partnership further began during the GEF-5 replenishment negotiations in 2009 and 2010. The [Policy Recommendations for the Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund](#) called on the Secretariat, in collaboration with the GEF Trustee, to “prepare a proposal for Council review in June 2010 to allow additional agencies referred to in paragraph 28 of the Instrument to cooperate with the Secretariat and Trustee directly.... To assist recipient countries in preparing and implementing GEF-financed projects.”⁵¹

13. Between June 2010 and May 2011, the Council discussed whether and how to broaden the GEF partnership. In November 2010, based on the recommendations presented in the [Broadening of the GEF Partnership under Paragraph 28 of the GEF Instrument: Key Policy Issues](#),⁵² the Council decided to broaden the partnership through a pilot to accredit new agencies, which would be called GEF Project Agencies. The Council also decided that the rules and criteria for accreditation of the new Project Agencies, such as new policies on environmental and social safeguards, would apply to the existing GEF Agencies to ensure a level playing field. In its May 2011 meeting, the GEF Council approved the policies, procedures, and criteria for accrediting new institutions. It approved the policy entitled [Agency Minimum](#)

⁵¹ Summary of Negotiations, Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, Council Document GEF/C.37/3, page 108.

⁵² GEF/C.39/08/Rev.2

[Standards on Environmental and Social Safeguards](#) in November 2011, which contains an important set of criteria that applicants must meet in order to be accredited.

14. The pilot accreditation process did seek to base its decision-making partly on “gaps,”⁵³ but none of the four Council papers that served as the basis for the Council’s discussion clearly specified the specific gaps that the pilot sought to fill. The value-added criteria under Stage I of the accreditation procedure did ask certain types of Agencies to demonstrate how they would fill “gaps” in the GEF portfolio or network, but the Council document doesn’t mention specific gaps. The value-added criteria indicated that such gaps could be of a geographic or sectoral nature (“sectors, regions, or countries in which existing GEF Agencies have had difficulty implementing projects”⁵⁴) but also that the gap could be in terms of specific skills, capabilities, or technologies that the existing Agencies did not possess.⁵⁵

15. The accreditation procedure through which GEF Project Agencies would join the Partnership has three distinct stages:

- (a) **Stage 1: Submission of Stage 1 Application, Value-added Review, and Council Approval.** Applicants submit a completed Stage I Application form along with an endorsement letter from a GEF Operational Focal Point that identifies an initial project. Complete applications are reviewed by the Value-added Review Panel comprising of the Secretariat staff. Based on this review, the Secretariat recommends the selected applicants to the Council for approval.
- (b) **Stage 2: Accreditation Panel Review.** Applicants that are approved by Council then submit a completed Stage II Application Form for review by the Accreditation Panel. The applicants pay an upfront fee of US \$ 25,000 for the first desk review. The Accreditation Panel then conducts an initial desk review. If further desk reviews and/or field verification are required, an additional fee is determined by

⁵³ The stated rationale for the agreed pilot was that “the inclusion of agencies with different strengths and capabilities will help the GEF accomplish its mandate, since it will add value to the GEF network, including by providing recipient countries with greater choice in terms of agencies, and by providing the GEF with additional expertise and an ability to fill gaps.” See Council Document GEF/C.40/09, *Broadening the GEF Partnership under Paragraph 28 of the GEF Instrument*, page 1, paragraph 5.

⁵⁴ Under Value-Added Criteria 1(Relevance to the GEF), “International NGOs, UN Agencies and Programs, and Other (non-regional) International Organizations” were required to “demonstrate how they will address important gaps in the GEF portfolio.” This would “require demonstrating capacity that they are able to implement GEF projects in sectors, regions, or countries in which existing GEF Agencies have had difficulty implementing projects, for example because of their small size or in a niche field of a GEF [focal] area or region of the world.” (See Council Document GEF/C.40/09, page 8.

⁵⁵ See the discussion of requirements for potential projects from any bilateral development agencies that might be accredited. Such agencies would be required to provide in their PIFs a “compelling justification for how the agency offers a clear comparative advantage in terms of its ability to fill gaps in the context of the GEF or the specific project.” Such gaps could be in terms of geography, innovation and expertise, leverage, or sectors (including technologies.) Council Document GEF/C.40/09, page 16.

the Secretariat, on a case by case basis, to cover the associated cost and is paid by the applicants. Applicants that receive the Accreditation Panel's approval then proceed to the Stage 3 of the accreditation process.

- (c) **Stage 3: Conclusion of Memorandum of Understanding and Financial Procedures Agreement.** Applicants sign an MoU with the Secretariat in which they commit to follow all relevant GEF policies and procedures. The GEF Trustee then enters into a Financial Procedures Agreement (FPA) with the GEF Project Agency that enables the Trustee to commit and transfer funds. Upon conclusion of the FPA, the entity is included in the GEF partnership as a Project Agency and is eligible to receive resources directly from the trust funds managed by the GEF.

16. As of June 2015, eight applicants for accreditation (out of a total of 11 initially approved by the Council at the end of Stage I) had successfully completed Stage II of the Accreditation process, meaning that they had been found by the GEF Accreditation Panel to meet all required standards and criteria for accreditation. Of these eight entities, six - CI, DBSA, FECO, FUNBIO, IUCN, and WWF-US - have completed Stage III of the process by signing both an MOU with the GEF Secretariat and FPA with the GEF Trustee. Two Agencies – BOAD and CAF– are working to sign their FPA with the Trustee.

17. As shown in Table 2 below, the Council has approved 13 projects (six MSPs and seven FSPs) to be implemented by new GEF Project Agencies, for a total value of \$70.8 million. The first of these projects was only approved in November 2013. Eleven of these projects are being developed or implemented by CSOs, while two were submitted by DBSA. As several Project Agencies only formally joined the Partnership in the past year, this list will grow over time.

18. Presently, the GEF Partnership includes 6 inter-governmental institutions that are global in scope (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, FAO, IFAD, UNIDO), five regional development banks (ADB, AfDB, EBRD, IADB, and CAF), one sub-regional development bank (BOAD), three national-level Agencies (FUNBIO, FECO, DBSA) and three international conservation NGOs (CI, IUCN, and WWF-US). Collectively, their work covers all GEF focal areas and all GEF regions and sub-regions.

Table 2: Approved Projects of GEF Project Agencies
(Chronological order, as of September 15, 2015)

Agency	Country/ Region	Focal Area	Project Title	GEF Grant	Date of Approval
WWF-US	Russian Fed.	BD	Conservation of Big Cats	12,707,550	11/7/2013
WWF-US	Nepal	LD	Sustainable Land Management in the Churia Range	917,431	12/19/2013
CI	Paraguay	CCM	Innovative Use of a Voluntary Payment for Environmental Services Scheme to Avoid and Reduce GHG Emissions and Enhance Carbon Stocks in the Highly Threatened Dry Chaco Forest Complex in Western Paraguay	2,201,614	3/21/2014
CI	Liberia	BD	Improve Sustainability of Mangrove Forests and Coastal Mangrove Areas in Liberia through Protection, Planning and Livelihood Creation- as a Building Block Towards Liberia's Marine and Coastal Protected Areas	963,994	5/8/2014
CI	Global	BD	Mainstreaming Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management in Priority Socio Ecological Production Landscapes and Seascapes (SEPLS)	1,909,000	5/8/2014
WWF-US	Global	BD	Protected Areas Planning in the Era of Climate Change (PAPEC)	1,804,862	5/8/2014
CI	Global	BD	Effectively Mainstreaming Biodiversity Conservation into Government Policy and Private Sector Practice Piloting Sustainability Models to Take the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) to Scale	9,800,000	5/27/2014
WWF-US	Regional (BLZ, GTM, HND, MEX)	IW	Integrated Transboundary Ridges-to-Reef Management of the Mesoamerican Reef	9,018,349	5/27/2014
CI	Mexico	CC	Maintaining and Increasing Carbon Stocks in Agro-silvopastoral Systems in Rural Communities of the Selva El Ocote Biosphere Reserve as a Climate Change Mitigation Strategy	1,009,174	6/9/2014
CI	Regional (COL, CRI, ECU, PAN)	IW	Improving Mangrove Conservation across the Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape (ETPS) through Coordinated Regional and National Strategy Development and Implementation	1,900,810	6/11/2014
DBSA	South Africa	BD	Unlocking Biodiversity Benefits through Development Finance in Critical Catchments	7,201,835	6/4/2015
DBSA	South Africa	CC	Equity Fund for the Small Projects Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (non-grant)	15,000,000	6/4/2015
IUCN	Regional: (CIV, LBR, SLE)	MFA	Mano River Union Ecosystem Conservation and Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) Project ⁵⁶	6,336,364	7/8/2015
Total				70,770,983	

⁵⁶ This is a GEF-5 project that was originally submitted and approved for the African Development Bank. It was transferred to IUCN on July 8, 2015, which is the date listed in the right column.

19. It should also be noted that several Project Agencies are involved in the Integrated Approach Pilots and the other programmatic approaches approved by Council in June 2015. While individual projects under these programs are under preparation, Agency participation in these important initiatives is illustrated in the table below.

Table 3: Agencies Involved in IAPs and GEF-6 Programmatic Approaches

Name of Program	Project Agencies Involved	GEF Agencies Involved
Food-IAP: Fostering Sustainability and Resilience for Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa - An Integrated Approach (IAP Program)	CI	IFAD, UNEP, FAO, UNDP, World Bank, CI, UNIDO
Commodities-IAP: Taking Deforestation Out of Commodity Supply Chains (IAP Program)	CI, WWF-US	UNDP/World Bank, IADB, UNEP
Cities-IAP: Sustainable Cities Integrated Approach Pilot (IAP-Program)	DBSA	World Bank/ADB, AfDB, IADB, UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO
CFI: Coastal Fisheries Initiative (Program)	WWF-US, CI	FAO, UNDP, World Bank, UNEP
Global Partnership on Wildlife Conservation and Crime Prevention for Sustainable Development (Program)	IUCN, WWF-US	World Bank/UNDP, UNEP, ADB